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ing words" inciting violence "on the 
basis of race, color, creed, religion or 
gender," was unconstitutional be-
cause it prohibited only particular 
fighting words and violated the re-
striction against content-based dis-
crimination. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 
2200-01 (quotingR.A. v., 505 U.S. at 
(1992». The Mitchell Court dis-
tinguished the penalty enhancing stat-
ute, which involved constitutionally 
unprotected conduct, from the ordi-
nance in R.A. V. because that ordi-
nance explicitly prohibited expres-
sion. Id. at 2200-01. 
In addition, the Court noted the 
societal value and importance of the 
penalty-enhancement statute's appli~ 
cation to discriminatory conduct. Id. 
at 2201. The Court determined that 
society's need to redress discrimina-
tory crimes justifies the existence of 
the penalty-enhancement statute. 
Therefore, the Court rejected the con-
Monias v. Endal 
TORT VICTIMS MAY 
RECOVER FOR "LOST 
YEARS" OF A SHORTENED 
LIFE EXPECTANCY 
BUT FAMILY MEMBERS 
MAYNOr. 
tention that the statute was founded 
merely upon the legislature's disagree-
ment with such discriminatory be-
liefs. Id. 
The Supreme Court concluded by 
dismissing Mitchell's contentions that 
the penalty-enhancing statute is con-
stitutionally overbroad and has a chill-
ing effect on speech. Id. In so hold-
ing, the Court envisioned the stifled 
tones of bigoted individuals who an-
ticipate future trials where evidence 
of their bigotry is allowed, and found 
such a hypothesis not only attenuated, 
but too speculative to warrant 
Mitchell's contention. Id. The Court 
further noted that the First Amend-
ment does not bar the use of speech as 
evidence of elements of a crime, and 
that Mitchell's contention in this re-
gard had previously been rejected in 
Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S. 631 
(1947). Id. at 2201-2. Therefore, 
evidence of discriminatory conduct is 
The Court of Appeals of Mary-
land recently defined how damages 
should be calculated for loss of house-
hold services and loss of wages for the 
"lost years" when a plaintiff's nor-
mal life expectancy has been reduced 
as a result of a defendant's negli-
gence. In Monias v. Endal, 330 Md. 
274,623 A.2d 656 (1993), the court 
expanded a personal injury plaintiff's 
recovery by permitting an award for 
lost earnings damages for the period 
of the "lost years" of the plaintiff's 
shortened life expectancy. At the 
same time, the court refused to permit 
recovery for loss of services to the 
plaintiff's children during the same 
time period. 
Glenna and Andrew Endal filed a 
medical malpractice action against 
Ms. Endal' s gynecologist, Dr. Michael 
Monias, alleging that Dr. Monias was 
negligent in failing to diagnose and 
treat breast cancer in Ms. Endal. In 
August, 1986, Glenna Endal went to 
Dr. Monias after discovering a small 
lump in her breast. She was assured 
admissible in establishing the appli-
cability of the penalty-enhancement 
statute. 
In affirming the legislature's im-
position of a stronger incentive for 
racially motivated crimes by conclud-
ing that a penalty-enhancing statute 
does not violate the First Amendment, 
the Supreme Court has opened the 
window of opportunity for Congress 
to take action in addressing racial 
unrest and discriminatory problems 
throughout the United States. Up-
holding the constitutionality of a stat-
ute which allows increased penalties 
for hate motivated crimes not only 
provides a framework for the con-
flicting state decisions on similar stat-
utes, but also takes a bold step in 
granting the government the power to 
address the discrimination which 
plagues our country. 
-Kimberly A. Kelly 
that the lump was "fibrocystic breast 
disease," and there was "nothing to 
worry about." Dr. Monias ordered a 
mammogram, but did not order a bi-
opsy. Ms. Endal saw Dr. Monias six 
months later as instructed. Again, a 
mammogram was ordered, but not a 
biopsy.' Approximately eight months 
after her second visit, Ms. Endal re-
turned to Dr. Monias, who then re-
ferred her to a specialist who per-
formed a biopsy which revealed a 
malignant tumor. A lumpectomy re-
vealed that the cancer had metasta-
sized and was in an advanced state. 
According to expert medical tes-
timony, if the breast cancer had been 
properly diagnosed in August, 1986, 
Ms. Endal would have had an 85-
90% probability of survival and a 
normal life expectancy. Because the 
cancer had advanced, Ms. Endal had 
onlya20%chanceofsurvival beyond 
November, 1992. 
The case was submitted to the 
jury on written issues, and the trial 
judge divided the elements of dam-
ages into damages before November, 
1992, the statistically probable date 
of Ms. Endal's premature death, and 
damages after November, 1992, which 
were called "post premature death" 
danlages. The second category in-
cluded 1) the loss of income between 
Ms. Endal's probable date of death 
from cancer to her probable retire-
ment date at age 65, and 2) loss of 
services to her three children from 
Ms. Endal's probable date of death 
until the youngest child reached age 
18. 
The total jury award for damages 
for the period before November, 1992 
was $461,682.00. "Post premature 
death" damages were awarded in the 
amounts of $250,000 for loss of in-
come or earnings, and $200,000 for 
loss of household services to the chil-
dren. In an unreported opinion, the 
court of special appeals affirmed the 
jury's determination of liability and 
affirmed all damage awards except 
for the $200,000 "post premature 
death" damage award for the loss of 
household services to Ms. Endal's 
children. Thecourtofappealsgranted 
certiorari to review the damage award 
for loss of earnings and loss of ser-
vices. 
The court of appeals began its 
discussion of the loss of earnings 
award by noting that this was a per-
sonal injury action as opposed to ei-
ther a survival or wrongful death ac-
tion, and that recovery in this action 
would preclude a duplicative recov-
ery for the same damages for loss of 
support in a wrongful death action. 
Manias, 330 Md. at 279-80. The 
cou rt specifically rejected Dr. Monias' 
contention that future loss of wages is 
limited to the plaintiff's actual (short-
ened) life expectancy rather than the 
plaintiff's normal expectancy had the 
tort not occurred. ld. at 280. This 
issue had been left open in Rhone v. 
Fisher, 224 Md. 223, 231-32, 167 
A. 2d 773,779 (1961), where the court 
stated the rule that "generally a plain-
tiff is not entitled to recover damages 
for the 'lost years' themselves where 
the defendant's tort shortened the 
plaintiff's life expectancy." ld. at 
280-81, 623 A.2d at 659. However, 
the plaintiff in Rhone failed to raise 
the issue of loss of earnings for the 
"lost years." 
Stating that "[they would] not 
permit the tortfeasor to reduce liabil-
ity for the victim's loss of earnings by 
reducing the victim's life expectancy," 
the court found that Ms. Endal was 
entitled to her loss of future earnings 
based on the normal life expectancy 
had she been properly diagnosed and 
treated. ld. at 282, 623 A.2d at 660. 
As for the loss-of-services award, 
the court of appeals concluded that 
the award for the period before Ms. 
Endal's probable premature death was 
included in either the $200,000 
"noneconomic damages" award, or 
the $75,000 award for loss of consor-
tium. ld. at 283, 623 A.2d at 660. 
The loss-of-services award at issue 
was the "post premature death" award 
of $200,000 for "loss of household 
services to children." 
As noted above, the general rule 
is that a plaintiff cannot recover dam-
ages for the "lost years" of a short-
ened life expectancy caused by a 
defendant's negligence. Rhone v. 
Fisher, supra. The Rhone court did, 
however, acknowledge two potential 
categories ofrecoverable damages re-
lating to a plaintiff's "lost years." 
The first category was mental suffer-
ing resulting from knowledge of the 
shortened life expectancy. The Rhone 
court upheld a jury's award that in-
cluded such damages. Monias, 330 
Md. at 283, 623 A.2d at 660. The 
second category, approved in the in-
stant case, was "lost earnings during 
the lost years." ld. The Monias court 
recognized that this case involved a 
third category - "loss of services that 
the tort victim will not be able to 
provide to her family because of her 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
shortened life expectancy." ld. at 
284, 623 A.2d at 660. 
The court referred to Ms. Endal's 
contention that loss-of-services dam-
ages should be treated the same as 
loss-of-earnings damages, but noted 
that none of the cases cited by Ms. 
Endal in support of this contention 
addressed the issue of loss-of-ser-
vices damages as it related to the "lost 
years" of a plaintiff's life expect-
ancy.ld. at 284, 623 A.2d at 661. 
The court differentiated between 
the two, stating that the case for rec-
ognizing loss-of-services damages re-
lating to "lost years" is not as com-
pelling as the case for recognizing 
loss-of-earnings damages for the same 
years. ld. "Loss-of-earnings dam-
ages are to compensate a tort victim 
for income the victim will not receive 
because of the tort. Loss-of-services 
damages, on the other hand, are to 
compensate a tort victim for services 
the victim will not be able to provide 
because ofthe tort." ld. (emphasis in 
original) Recognizing that while tort 
victims may seek damages for loss of 
services they would have provided for 
themselves, the court pointed out that 
the loss-of-services award in the in-
stant case was to compensate Ms. 
Endal's family. Holding that family 
members should properly seek recov-
ery for loss of services in a wrongful 
death action, the court of appeals 
found no justification for extending 
Rhone to permit a personal injury 
plaintiff's family to recover an award 
for loss-of-services damages for the 
"lost years" of a shortened life ex-
pectancy.ld. at285, 623 A.2dat661. 
The court also presented, and re-
jected, two alternative theories for 
permitting an award for loss of house-
hold services to children. First, rec-
ognizing that this type of award is 
similar to a claim for "loss of parental 
consortium," the court found that 
Maryland law has not recognized such 
a claim for children except in the 
context of a wrongful death action. 
Id. Second, while Maryland has rec-
ognized a limited claim for loss of the 
economic value of a child's services, 
the court declined to recognize a re-
ciprocalloss ofparentai services claim 
on behalf of minor children. Id. at 
286,623 A.2d at 661-62. 
By pennitting a personal injury 
McCready Memorial Hospital 
v. Hauser 
CLAIMANT'S ATTEMPT TO 
OBTAIN AUTOMATIC EXTEN-
SION FOR FILING EXPERT'S 
CERTIFICATE PURSUANT TO 
THE MARYLAND HEALTH 
CARE MALPRACTICE 
CLAIMS STATUTE NOT TRIG-
GERED BY MERE REQUEST 
UNDER § 3-2A-04(b)(J)(ii). 
plaintiff to recover damages for lost 
income, the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land eliminated the general rule that a 
plaintiff cannot recover for the "lost 
years" of a shortened life expect-
ancy caused by a defendant's negli-
gence. However, by refusing to allow 
recovery of damages for the tort 
In McCready Memorial Hospi-
tal v. Hauser, 624 A.2d 1249 (Md. 
1993), the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land recently held that a claimant 
instituting an action under the Mary-
land Health Care Malpractice Claims 
Statute and attempting to obtain an 
extension to file the required certifi-
cate of qualified expert under Md. 
Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 3-2A-
04(b)( 1 )(ii) must actually file the 
expert's certificate within 180 days 
from the initial filing of the action. 
The court concluded that a 90-day 
extension was automatic in a narrow 
class of cases, however, merely re-
questing a § 3-2A-04(b)( I )(ii) exten-
sion is not the proper path a claimiant 
should take. 
On March 14, 1990, five days 
before the statute oflimitations was to 
run on their claim, John and Maxine 
Hauser filed a claim with the Health 
Claims Arbitration Office (''HCAO'') 
pursuant to the Maryland Health Care 
Malpractice Claims Statute, Md. Cts. 
& Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 3-2A-
04(b)(I). The Hausers named the 
Edward J. McCready Memorial Hos-
pital and two doctors who had con-
sulted with Mrs. Hauser as defen-
dants. They alleged that the doctors 
had negligently diagnosed her condi-
tion, allowing a cancerous tumor to 
go untreated. McCready Memorial 
Hospital was to be held vicariously 
liable for the acts of the doctors. 
While the Hausers' "claim was 
timely filed, [they] failed to file an 
victim's children under a "lost years" 
theory, and refusing to recognize al-
ternative theories of recovery, the cou rt 
of appeals has made it clear that tort 
victims and their families have spe-
cific means of seeking recovery that 
the judiciary is not willing to expand. 
-Kelly Reaver 
expert's certificate with the HCAO 
within 90 days as required by § 3-2A-
04(b)(l)(i) .... " Id. at 1251-52. 
After the filing period had expired, the 
defendants filed motions to dismiss, 
asserting that the Hausers had failed 
to comply with the filing requirements 
of § 3-2A-04(b)( I )(i). Not until July 
3, 1990, 21 days after the 90-day 
filing period had expired, did the 
Hausers respond to the motions to 
dismiss. Id. at 1252. An expert's 
certificate was not filed; however, the 
Hausers requested a 90 day extension 
pursuantto §3-2A-04(b)(l)(ii), which 
reads: 
(ii) In lieu of dismissing the claim, 
the panel chainnan shall grant an 
extension of no more than 90 days for 
filing the certificate required by 
this paragraph, if: 
1. The limitations period ap-
plicable to the claim has expired;and 
2. The failure to file the cer-
tificate was neither willful nor the 
result of gross negligence. ld. 
The Hausers contended that they 
came under the ambit of § 3-2A-
04(b)( 1 )(ii), asserting that the statute 
oflimitations had run and their failure 
to file an expert's certificate was nei-
ther willful nor the result of gross 
negligence. Id. 
At a hearing on October 17, 1990, 
over 200 days after the Hausers filed 
their claims, the HCAO Panel Chair 
dismissed the claims for failure to file 
an expert's certificate or request an 
extension within the initial 90-day 
